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Abstract 
Since the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act, regulatory compliance costs have been so 
burdensome for some companies that they have chosen to go dark. Go-dark firms are 
those that deregister from the Securities and Exchange Commission and delist from the 
national stock exchange market but remain public on over-the-counter (OTC) markets. 
This paper covers 402 US firms that went dark between April 5
th
, 2010 and April 5
th
, 
2014 and finds that firms with higher leverage and audit fees are more likely to go dark, 
and that registration announcements have negative effects on the firms’ stock price and 
liquidity employing logit regression and event study methodology. Most importantly, this 
paper introduces specific titles of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act, which might 
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While the general public still considers the initial public offering (IPO) an important 
stage in a company’s life because the IPO infuses more capital into the firm and increases 
public awareness of it as a successful and reliable company, several researchers have 
investigated the benefits of going private. Private companies usually have no agency 
problems since their shareholders are most likely the management and directors. 
Periodical reports and announcements to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
would also be unnecessary, and crucial business and operations information would not be 
exposed to potential competitors. Particularly, the Sarbanes–Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 
imposes too much regulatory burdens on registered companies, forcing many firms to 
reconsider staying public. (Since the passage of the SOX Act, the regulatory changes to 
reporting requirements have imposed substantial pressure on small firms and on 
enterprises that do not generate significant, free cash flow (Bushee and Leuz, 2005). This 
bill was enacted as a reaction to some major corporate and accounting scandals, including 
Enron and Worldcom, which led to stricter financial governance laws. However, 
according to Business Finance,
1
 public company compliance costs can range from $1 
million to over $3 million annually, even for a relatively small company with a market 
capitalization of less than $50 million and total revenues of under $100 million.)  
 
Apart from going public or private, there exists a third option—going dark. For 
companies trying to avoid the debt overhang caused by leveraged buy-outs and complex 
and time-consuming procedures of privatization, going dark might be a better choice. 
Going-dark firms are those that voluntarily delist from the national security exchange 
market and subsequently deregister their shares from the SEC, but these shares are traded 
                                                        





on the over-the-counter (OTC) market or on pink sheets. Since the passage of the SOX 
Act, the compliance cost and other indirect costs have become a huge burden for small 
public firms that experience financial distress. Thus, some firms might opt to voluntarily 
delist and deregister while keeping a large investor base. From January 1, 1996 to May 
31, 2004, 406 US firms had gone dark (Marosi and Massoud, 2007), and the number is 
still increasing. Fortunately, on April 5, 2012, US President Barack Obama passed the 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act, which removed some excessive regulations 
and rules imposed by the SOX Act. This paper investigates whether the passage of this 
new act would make an impact on the firms’ decision to go dark. It also examines the 
effects of other firm-specific reasons—related to their financial situation and stock 
price—on this decision.  
 
This paper hypothesizes that fewer firms would go dark after the JOBS Act, mainly 
because this act reduced the regulatory compliance costs. It also presumes that firms with 
more intangible assets, higher leverage, higher insider ownership, lower momentum and 
volume, and higher audit fees would more likely go dark. For the free cash flow, the 
combined effect is not clear. The statistical analysis and empirical results confirm most of 
the hypotheses; however, only the leverage and audit fee variables are significant in the 
logistical regression examining the probability of firms going dark. This paper also 
examines the deregistration announcement’s effect on stock price and market liquidity 
and finds that the stocks of firms that have gone dark experience negative, cumulative 
average abnormal returns and less liquidity after deregistration.  
 
The rest of the paper can be divided into six parts. Section 2 deals with the literature 
review regarding why firms go public, private, or dark and explains each specific title of 
the JOBS Act that influences the decision to go dark. Section 3 presents the hypotheses 
regarding the number of firms that have gone dark before and after the JOBS Act, the 
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firms’ specific characteristics that influence their choices, and the impacts of 
deregistration on stock price and liquidity. Sections 4 and 5 describe the data and 
methodology used in this study. Section 6 explains the empirical results, and Section 7 
draws the conclusions.  
 
2. Literature Review 
 
2.1 The decision to go dark 
Why would firms opt to delist from the major stock exchange market and deregister from 
SEC but remain public on the OTC market? This section compares going-private, 
going-dark, and going-public firms and reviews the existing literature.   
 
The differences among going-private, going-dark, and going-public firms can also be 
demonstrated from the following perspective. Going-private firms delist from all stock 
exchange markets, whether national or OTC. On the other hand, going-dark firms delist 
from the national stock exchange market but still trade on the OTC, whereas going-public 
firms can trade on the national stock exchange market and on pink sheets. Thus, to 
uncover the reasons behind the decision to go dark, the benefits and costs of registration 
and listing need to be researched. Generally speaking, stock market flotation provides 
firms with numerous advantages. Listed firms could obtain new sources of capital to 
finance new projects, make acquisitions, and mitigate debt overhang (Ransley, 1984). By 
doing so, not only is existing leverage reduced, but it also empowers firms to obtain 
further debt capital. Since the financial situations of listed firms have been improved, 
banks and other financial institutions would be willing to lend more money. In the event 
of a rising competition among suppliers of finance, public firms may be offered with 
diverse sources of capital on better terms (Pickens, 1987. However, if the firms persist in 
having high leverage issues, then these issues could not be resolved by limited public 
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offerings. Managers of public firms may also face the danger of losing control (Pagano et 
al., 1995a. Research evidence showed that the initial owners only divested 6% when their 
firms undertook IPOs and 1.3% more in the subsequent three years. After three years, the 
turnover of the controlling group was larger than normal, which implied that the IPO was 
actually the sale of the company (Pagano and Panetta, 1998). If the management is also 
the company’s owner, it will try to maximize its wealth by divesting while remaining the 
majority control holder (Zingales, 1995). When it appears to be losing control, the 
management may decide to go dark as the OTC market involves fewer investors than the 
national stock exchange market, while providing relatively more capital sources than 
private firms. However, the trading volume, stock prices, and analyst coverage will likely 
be significantly lower for OTC markets. Additionally, if going-dark firms reach the 
registration limit in the future, they may need to resume publicly filing reports; at that 
time, the SEC regulatory landscape may change a lot, which will require significant time, 
effort, and money from the board of directors and the management to familiarize 
themselves with the new changes.  
 
The process of going private requires the company to employ its own cash and reserves 
to buy out other stockholders, which may leave it in a more precarious financial situation. 
Evidence suggests that these firms are inefficiently managed, underleveraged, and 
undervalued by the market (Jensen, 1986; Kaplan, 1989a; Lehn and Poulsen, 1989; 
Lichtenberg and Siegel, 1990). The management and directors may sometimes also 
participate in this process, whether in the form of remaining shareholders or shareholders 
of their own company. Furthermore, the SEC needs to review all material information 
regarding the transaction, and after a long period of waiting, the transaction is finally 
completed. The whole process is complex and time-consuming.  
 
Two important studies about this topic had been carried out. Marosi and Massoud (2007) 
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found that firms with fewer valuable growth opportunities, greater insider ownership, 
lower institutional ownership, higher leverage, and lower market momentum were more 
likely to go dark. With the passage of the SOX Act, the compliance cost was one of the 
main driving forces behind going dark. Marosi and Massoud (2007) also reported that 
upon the deregistration announcement, the shareholders of those firms suffered 
significantly negative, cumulative abnormal returns, with less liquid shares. However, in 
the end, Marosi and Massoud (2007) mentioned that the SEC might consider 
ameliorating some reporting burdens imposed on small firms. Leuz, Triantis, and Wang 
(2008) tried to analyze this phenomenon from two economic aspects (cost saving and 
agency conflict). They also pointed out that the SOX Act imposed regulatory costs on 
firms, and firms with a smaller size, poorer market performance, higher leverage, and 
fewer growth opportunities would likely go dark. On the other hand, firms that go dark 
would have on average larger (positive and negative) accruals relative to their cash flow 
from operations, larger free cash flow problems, and weaker board governance and 
outside monitoring, which would support the agency conflict hypothesis. This hypothesis 
has become more important in explaining why firms choose to go dark. This body of 
evidence supports the negative market reaction to deregistration announcements.  
 
2.2 Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act 
The passage of the JOBS Act is one of the many factors that affects the deregistration 
decision. It contains seven titles, as follows: 1) Title I – Reopening American capital 
markets to emerging growth companies, 2) Title II – Access to capital for job creators, 3) 
Title III – Crowdfunding, 4) Title IV – Small company capital formation, 5) Title V – 
Private company flexibility and growth, 6) Title VI – Capital expansion, and 7) Title VII 
– Outreach on changes to the law. However, not all these titles affect the going-dark 
phenomenon, except Titles I, V, and VI. Title I defines “emerging growth companies”2 as 
                                                        
2If they issue more than $1 billion in nonconvertible debt over a three-year period or become a “large 
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those with less than $1 billion in total annual gross revenues in their most recent fiscal 
year and relieves those companies from certain regulatory and disclosure requirements, 
such as disclosure of executive compensation, financial disclosures and accounting 
pronouncements, internal control audit, and so on. On the other hand, for many firms that 
consider going dark, cost saving is one of their main reasons since the SOX Act imposes 
many burdens on these companies, especially those with limited revenues and cash flow. 
Thus, if firms qualify as “emerging growth companies,” as defined in the JOBS Act, they 
would bear less regulatory and disclosure costs and would have less motivation to go 
dark. Actually, the $1-billion threshold covers plenty of firms. Titles V and VI increase 
the threshold requirements for deregistration only for banks and bank holding companies 
(deregistration is permitted for any class of securities held by fewer than 1,200 
shareholders of record); no change has been made to the eligibility requirements for 
deregistration of a non-bank company’s class of securities under the Exchange Act. Based 
on Titles I, V, and VI, emerging growth companies that list for less than five years and 
banks and bank holding companies would be affected by the JOBS Act and in turn, go 
dark. Titles I, V, and VI immediately became effective upon enactment on April 5, 2012. 
Title III also mentions a new exemption from the requirement to register public offerings 
with the SEC, for certain types of small offerings, subject to several conditions, which 
might mitigate the registration requirements for certain companies and induce them to 
maintain reporting with the SEC for a longer period of time. However, this title is 
scheduled for October 2015, which is beyond the research period covered in this study.  
 
Martin (2012) examined the JOBS Act mainly from the perspective of equity-based 
crowdfunding. The benefits of the JOBS Act outweighed its burdens since it had the 
potential for business development and start-up growth, which would provide numerous 
                                                                                                                                                                     
accelerated filer” under Rule 12b-2 until the fifth anniversary of their IPO, they would be withdrawn from 
this status.  
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job opportunities (Martin, 2012). Although investors might be exposed to fraudulent 
issuers, which would trigger confidence loss in the market, these investors would still have 
fundamental safeguards. Parrino and Romeo (2012) believed that the JOBS Act would 
assist emerging growth companies with numerous security-law concerns in the transition 
process from private to public firms. Both investors and companies would enjoy the 
broadened opportunities to access and employ capital. However, investment scams and 
other wrongdoings should be identified during this process. My paper reviews the JOBS 
Act mainly from the perspective of emerging growth companies and Title I, and there is 
scarce literature that focuses on this aspect.  
 
Certainly, other factors, such as the market performance of equities and the legal 
environment for listing, would also have effects on the amount of going-dark firms. After 
the Dow Jones Industrial Average, NASDAQ Composite, and S&P 500 are checked out, 
it is not difficult to find that the stock performance is robust, and firms would be more 
willing to be or stay public. Therefore, when firms consider the strategic restructuring of 
their business, whether being merged and acquired or going dark, they would weigh the 
relative benefits and costs. The company-specific characteristics could also make a 
difference, which are explained for the rest of this paper. 
 
3. Hypotheses  
 
3.1 The number of going-dark firms would decrease after the JOBS Act 
1) Fewer emerging growth companies would go dark after the JOBS Act. 
Title I of the JOBS Act eases certain regulatory and disclosure requirements for emerging 
companies, which motivates them to remain registered with the SEC instead of going 
dark. These companies would reconsider the relative benefits and costs of registration. 
With the removal of the regulatory burdens of the SOX Act, these firms have fewer 
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incentives to go dark. According to Martin (2012), emerging growth companies are 
exempt from certain executive pay disclosure requirements under the 1934 Act and the 
Investor Protection and Security Reform Act of 2010. Additionally, emerging growth 
companies will only present less than two years of audits in their IPO registration 
statements, and they are exempt from reporting “selected financial data” under Rule 301 
and internal controls auditing under Section 404(b), as well as the mandatory audit firm 
rotation. Parrino and Romeo (2012) also mentioned that emerging growth companies and 
private companies would receive similar treatment in complying with new or revised 
financial accounting standards.  
2) More banks and BHC companies would go dark after the JOBS Act. 
Banks and bank holding companies have become easier to deregister than previously 
since Titles V and VI increased the threshold requirement of deregistration for these types 
of companies from 300 to 1,200 shareholders of record. If theoretically, the percentage of 
the firms going dark would not change, the number of these firms would increase since 
they are qualified to deregister now.   
 
The different titles of the JOBS Act affect the going-dark phenomenon from different 
perspectives. The combined effects of Titles I, V, and VI would increase the number of 
firms going dark since the definition of emerging growth companies covers a larger 
portion of firms going dark compared to banks and bank holding companies. Marosi and 
Massoud (2007) and Leuz et al. (2008) both noticed a dramatic growth in the number of 
firms that went dark after the SOX Act, and they found the compliance cost and the 
passage of the SOX Act as among the major driving forces behind a firm’s decision to go 
dark.  
 
3.2 The impact of firm characteristics on the decision to go dark 
1) Smaller companies would have more incentives to go dark. 
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The regulatory costs, audit fees, and indirect costs would not be as burdensome for larger 
companies compared to their smaller counterparts, and many of the larger firms would 
prefer to maintain public visibility to reassure their customers, shareholders, and other 
stakeholders. According to Crain and Hopkins (2001), the regulatory compliance cost was 
$8,086 per employee in 2008, and the small enterprises with fewer than 20 employees were 
burdened with most of the regulatory costs, which were 36% higher than those of larger 
companies with 500 or more employees. Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Leuz et al. 
(2008) reported the consistent finding that smaller companies would more likely go dark. 
2) Firms with more intangible assets would more likely go dark. 
There is information asymmetry between outsiders and insiders regarding the value of 
intangible assets. Thus, companies with more intangible assets would more likely go dark 
to give better value to such assets and take advantage of the information asymmetry. If the 
open market would undervalue such intangible assets, managers or directors might 
repurchase shares or make strategic decisions to achieve their assets’ underlying value. 
Barth and Kasznik (1999) found that firms with more intangible assets that were related to 
research and development and advertising were significantly more likely to repurchase 
shares. They also experienced positive abnormal returns during announcement periods. 
However, Marosi and Massoud (2007) found insignificant results regarding this 
hypothesis. 
3) Highly leveraged firms would more likely go dark. 
According to Healy and Palepu (2001), size, leverage, performance, and financial needs 
are major determinants of firms’ disclosure decisions. Healy and Palepu (1990), and 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996) found that highly leveraged firms were more 
likely to make strategic decisions. Moreover, it might be difficult for extremely 
high-leveraged firms to raise capital in public markets, and the management and directors 
might not expose their leverage information to shareholders. Marosi and Massoud (2007) 
and Leuz et al. (2008) confirmed this hypothesis.  
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4) Companies with higher insider ownership would have more incentives to go dark. 
Higher insider ownership empowers managers and directors to have their firms go dark to 
reduce corporate governance costs, achieve personal goals and appropriate cash flow, or 
avoid public scrutiny. Marosi and Massoud (2007) reported consistent results, while Leuz 
et al. (2008) found that firms with less institutional ownership had a higher probability of 
going dark. 
5) The decision to go dark would be uncertain for companies with high free cash flow. 
Jensen (1986), Lehn and Poulsen (1989), Opler and Titman (1993), and many other 
scholars found that firms with higher free cash flow would more likely go private since 
the higher free cash flow might induce managers to invest below the capital cost and on 
organizational efficiencies to obtain personal benefits. The decision to go private reduces 
the agency costs. However, the decision to go dark does not alleviate the agency problem 
but exacerbates it because the firm remains less visible from outsiders. On the other hand, 
for cash flow expropriation reasons, firms with higher cash flow might also have 
incentives to go dark. Marosi and Massoud (2007) found an insignificant result regarding 
the free cash flow variable.  
6) Following a period of positive momentum and high liquidity, companies would less 
likely go dark. 
In the event of strong stock price performance and high liquidity, companies would have 
the option to issue new securities, instead of going dark and deregistering with the SEC. 
Although the JOBS Act provides a new exemption from the requirement to register 
public offerings with the SEC for certain types of small offerings, deregistration still 
eliminates most of the possibilities. Marosi and Massoud (2007) reported a significant 
negative relation between the momentum and the possibility of going dark, while the 
volume variable was insignificant.  
7) Companies with higher audit fees would more likely go dark. 
The cost of regulatory compliance is one of the main reasons why firms choose to go 
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dark. If most of the companies that went dark from April 5, 2010 to April 5, 2014 fulfilled 
the requirements of emerging growth companies (in fact, $1 billion in total annual gross 
revenues included most of the start-ups and mediumsized companies), then going-dark 
companies would basically enjoy the exemption from governance and disclosure 
requirements, of which the audit fee would be one of the most measurable and significant 
costs. Marosi and Massoud (2007) found a positive relation between the audit fee and the 
possibility of going dark.  
 
3.3 The impact of deregistration on stock price and market liquidity 
1) Firms that went dark would experience negative abnormal returns.  
For shareholders and markets, the deregistration announcement might not be a positive 
signal as it would convey the facts about hiding important business and operations data, 
insiders appropriating free cash flow, or companies forced to go dark due to 
unsatisfactory performance. Both Marosi and Massoud (2007) and Leuz et al. (2008) 
found negative abnormal returns after deregistration announcements.  
2) After deregistration, the market liquidity of going-dark firms would be significantly 
lower than previously. 
Before deregistration, companies could trade on national stock markets with billions of 
investors. However, after deregistration, firms could only trade on the OTC markets, 
which had a limited number of investors, and because of inadequate information 
disclosure and the negative signal of going dark, both trading and analyst coverage would 
be significantly less. Marosi and Massoud (2007) found that trading liquidity was 
significantly reduced after going dark.  
 
4. Data  
 
Before collecting the data about the firms that went dark before and after the JOBS Act, 
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the process of going dark should be clarified. There are three predicates for SEC 
registration under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 before the JOBS Act, as follows: 
1. if a firm has shares listed on a national securities exchange, 
2. if it has over 500 record holders of a class of securities and total assets exceeding 
10 million, and 
3. if it has a registration statement that is declared effective under the Securities Act. 
Thus, if a firm intends to go dark, first, it should file a written notice of intent, 
specifically, file Form 25 with the stock exchange, pursuant to Rule 12d2-2(c)(2)(ii); 
issue a press release; and file Form 8-K, announcing that it is delisting and going dark. 
Next, it should file Form 15 to deregister its shares under the Exchange Act. This 
deregistration will become effective in 90 days. I identified going-dark firms by manually 
collecting the lists of entire firms (on SEC Edgar and Mergent Online) that filed Form 15 
from April 5, 2010 to April 5, 2014, which covered the period before and after the JOBS 
Act, including their CIK and SIC. Table 1 describes the different types of Form 15, 
excluding Form 15F since it concerns foreign private issuers. Form 15 contains 
information regarding the class of deregistered securities, remaining securities, and 
appropriate rule provisions relied on to suspend or terminate the duty to file reports. In 
this case, four types of filers should be excluded to screen going-dark firms, as follows: 
(1) firms that deregistered securities other than their common stock; (2) firms that 
deregistered their common stock but have other public securities that are still subject to 
public reporting requirements; (3) foreign companies (firms that filed Form 15 based on 
Rule 12g-4a(2)(i), 12g-4a(2)(ii), 12h-3b(2)(i), or 12h-3b(2)(ii)); and (4) firms that filed 
Form 15 due to mergers, acquisitions, liquidations, or bankruptcy. For the last exclusion, 
I used Bloomberg, Mergent Online, press releases, and announcements on the Factiva 
database and the firms’ websites to delete these firms. After this time-intensive procedure, 




Insert Table 1  
The financial data about these companies were gathered from various sources. The total 
assets, total liabilities, and intangible assets came from the balance sheets included in 
item 8 of Form 10-K with regard to financial statements and supplementary data. The 
insider ownership was usually displayed in the security ownership of certain beneficial 
owners and management and the related stockholder matter item of Form 10-K. The audit 
fees were indicated in Form 10-K or proxy statements, as well as the insider ownership. 
The first page of Form 10-K usually documented the total shares outstanding, while item 
5, the market for the registrant’s common equity, related stockholder matters, and issuer 
purchases of equity securities recorded the historical stock prices for these companies. 
The free cash flow variable was measured as the operating income before taxes, interest, 
and depreciation, which was calculated from the income statements in item 8. I ended 
with 248 firms; 140 and 108 deregistered before and after the JOBS Act, respectively. 
Table 2 divides these companies into two groups—(1) emerging companies and (2) banks 
and bank holding companies. Table 2 shows that 136 emerging firms went dark before 
the JOBS Act, and the number decreased to 108 after the JOBS Act, which confirms 
hypothesis 3.1.1, that fewer emerging firms would go dark after the passage of this act. 
Moreover, it was due to the removal of certain compliance and reporting costs, which 
amplified the benefits of registration with the SEC and listing on the national stock 
exchange market. The number of banks and bank holding companies increased after the 
JOBS Act as a result of the increased threshold requirement of deregistration for these 
companies, which is consistent with hypothesis 3.1.2. The combined effect would be the 
decrease in the number of total companies that went dark before and after the JOBS Act, 
as verified in Table 2.  
 




I matched the 248 firms on the basis of the industry classification by the Fama–French 5 
industry portfolio and total assets for one year before the deregistration date to check 
whether they would differ in insider ownership, leverage, audit fee, momentum, and so 
on. The total assets, total liabilities, intangible assets, total shares outstanding, market 
value of equity, and free cash flow (EBITDA) of the matched companies were collected 
from Compustat. Their insider ownership information was manually collected from item 
12 of Form 10-K, and the audit fee information mainly came from the AuditAnalytics 
database. The stock price information and trading volumes were gathered from 
Datastream. The total sample consisted of 186 firms.   
 
Table 3 exhibits the statistical analysis of the original firms and the matched firms and 
examines whether there is a significant difference between these two samples. Table 3 
shows that the audit fees of the going-dark firms are significantly higher than those of the 
matched firms, which is consistent with my hypothesis 3.2.7 that firms would go dark 
due to burdensome regulatory costs although the absolute amount of the firms that went 
dark decreased during the four-year period of my study. Since the control sample is 
matched on the basis of size, there should be no difference between the total assets of the 
original sample and the matched sample. The leverage of the going-dark sample is on 
average higher than that of the control sample, which once again confirms hypothesis 
3.2.3. Firms with higher leverage tend to go dark because they prefer to make strategic 
decisions, may be unable to raise capital in the main public markets due to their high 
leverage, or simply do not want to share their leverage information with shareholders and 
other stakeholders. For intangible assets and momentum, their magnitude in the original 
sample and the matched sample is also in accordance with other hypotheses although 
there are no significant differences between them. Firms with more intangible assets opt 
to go dark to give a better value to such assets and probably to appropriate their own 
benefits. When the momentum is low, firms also tend to go dark, considering the fewer  
 15 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
opportunities for public offering. However, there are no obvious differences between 
insider ownership and volume.  
 
The original sample is also divided into two subsamples—comprising before and after the 
JOBS Act. Table 4 presents the statistical analysis results for these two subsamples. T 
statistics measure the differences between them. Table 4 shows no significant differences 
among the various variables of the two subsamples. In other words, the audit fees of the 
firms that went dark before the JOBS Act exhibit no differences from those of the firms 
that went dark after the JOBS Act. The possible explanation is that the firms enjoying the 
benefits of reduced audit fees and regulatory compliance costs choose not to go dark, 
while for the firms that insist on going dark, the audit fees remain relatively high and 
exhibit no major difference from those of the firms that went dark before the JOBS Act. 
For the size variable, there is a slight difference between the two subsamples. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
The firms that went dark before the JOBS Act possess more total assets than the firms 
that went dark after the JOBS Act, which could be attributed to the decreased number of 
large firms as they are more capable of dealing with regulatory compliance costs than 
previously. Table 5 displays the correlation between each two variables; it can be 
concluded that there is no high correlation between them. The coefficient equals 1(-1) if 
the independent variables are totally positively (negatively) related.  
 






5.1 The decision to go dark  
Many factors influence the decision to go dark, such as the passage of certain acts, the 
change in an international economic situation, or the cycle of industrial booms and 
slumps. These factors will eventually affect each specific firm, which will be reflected in 
its financial statements and stock price. In this study, I therefore checked whether the 
decision to go dark would have connections with the financial information variable, stock 
price variables, and more importantly, the regulatory compliance cost of the JOBS Act, 
measured by the audit fee. The model is as follows:  
                                                    
where  
Y equals 1 if the firm goes dark; otherwise, it equals 0; 
SIZE is the firm’s total asset; 
INTAN means the intangible asset ratio, which indicates the intangible asset divided by 
the total asset; 
LEV is the leverage ratio, which denotes the total liabilities divided by the total asset; 
IO represents the security ownership ratio by all current executive officers and directors; 
FCF signifies the free cash flow divided by the market value of the asset; 
M is defined as the buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns;  
V means the average daily trading volume divided by the total shares outstanding; and 
AF is the log of the annual audit fee. 
 
5.2 The impact of deregistration announcement on stockholders  
In this section, the event study methodology is employed to check whether the 
deregistration announcement would make an impact on the stock price. The market 
model is used to calculate estimated returns. The coefficients are estimated based on the 
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estimation period, (-290, -46), in which the deregistration filing date on Edgar is regarded 
as day 0. The model is as follows: 
                  
where  
    is the return of security i on time t, and 
    is the market return on time t, which is measured by using TOTMKUS in 
Datastream. 
  
The abnormal return is the actual return subtracted by the estimated return of security i, 
and the calculations of the average abnormal return (AAR) and the cumulative average 
abnormal return (CAAR) are shown below:  
     
 
  
      
  
   
 
where      is the abnormal return of security i at time t, while    is the number of 
securities at time t.  
       
        
  
    
  
where the event period is between    and   . The calculations of the test statistics, 
including the t and p values, are also based on MacKinlay’s (1997) work.  
 
5.3 The impact of deregistration on liquidity
3
 
Apart from the impact on the stock price, I also checked whether deregistration would 
influence stock liquidity. The three measures of market liquidity are turnover, volatility, 
and trading days. These three measures are calculated for two periods—before 
deregistration (-90, -31) and after deregistration (31, 90). The days in between are 
excluded to rule out the noises of deregistration announcements. And the description 
                                                        
3Please refer to the same methodology by Marosi and Massoud (2007).  
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about variables used in the methodology is displayed in table 6.   
 
Insert Table 6 
 
6. Empirical Results 
 
Table 7 checks whether the basic characteristics of go-dark firms are influenced by the 
implementation of the JOBS Act. The data section has shown that the number of firms 
that went dark is significantly fewer after the JOBS Act as a result of the reduction in 
regulatory costs. However, after the regression results are checked (Table 7), the audit 
fees of the firms that went dark exhibit no significant differences before and after the 
JOBS Act. The reason is that the firms that have suffered from a certain level of 
regulatory burdens would choose to go dark, while those firms that have enjoyed the 
benefits of the JOBS Act and have reduced their regulatory compliance costs would 
remain registered. Thus, for firms that still intend to go dark, the audit fees would have 
no significant difference from other firms that went dark, no matter whether they did so 
before or after the JOBS Act.  
 
Insert Table 7  
 
Tables 8, 9, and 10 present the empirical results of the logit regression concerning the 
possibility of going dark and the impact of deregistration announcements on stock price 
and market liquidity. Table 8 incorporates eight models, with the first model solely 
including the audit fee variable. Each time, I add one more variable till the model 
includes all financial and stock price variables. Table 8 shows that the audit fee variable 
remains significant through all those eight models, and the significance level keeps 
increasing till model 8; the audit fee variable is significant at the 1% level. Therefore, the 
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regulatory compliance cost is indeed a crucial factor behind the decision to go dark. The 
other significant variable is leverage, at the 5% significance level. It demonstrates that 
firms with higher leverage are more willing to go dark. The reasons are that either they 
could not raise enough capital in the national stock exchange market due to their overly 
high leverage, or they prefer not to expose relevant information to shareholders and the 
public, in case these stakeholders view them as financially unhealthy firms. The 
coefficient of the free cash flow variable is negative, which means that firms with more 
free cash flow are more likely to stay registered with the SEC. It makes sense since going 
dark would not resolve agency problems but exacerbate them, especially when the free 
cash flow is high, and the agency cost is possibly relatively higher. The other variables 
are insignificant at any level. 
 
Insert Table 8 
 
Tables 9 and 10 report the impact of deregistration announcements on stock price and 
market liquidity. For the stock price effect, I checked seven event windows, as follows: (0, 
0), (0, +1), (0, +2), (0, +4), (0, +5), (0, +10), and (0, +15). The cumulative average 
abnormal returns remain significant during all these event windows. On the event date, 
the influence of the deregistration announcement does not reflect on the stock price so 
much as in other periods; however, it is robust enough to demonstrate that going-dark 
firms experience negative abnormal returns as soon as they file Form 15 for 
deregistration on the SEC. Half a month after the announcement, the cumulative 
abnormal return is as high as 28.28% compared with 1.77% during the first day. Table 10 
exhibits the mean, standard deviation, maximum and minimum values of 
pre-deregistration and post-deregistration turnover, volatility, and trading days for the 
original sample and the matched sample. These three measures of market liquidity are all 
significant, which implies that pre-deregistration liquidity and post-deregistration 
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liquidity are significantly different for both the original and the matched samples. 
However, the significance conveys different information. For the original sample, 
pre-deregistration turnover and trading days are obviously higher than those of the 
post-deregistration period, while pre-deregistration volatility is lower than that of the 
post-deregistration period, indicating that market liquidity is decreased and investment 
risk is increased after going dark. For the matched sample, pre-deregistration turnover 
and trading days are obviously lower compared to those of the post-deregistration period, 
while pre-deregistration volatility is lower than that of the post-deregistration period, 
indicating that generally, market liquidity is increased. Although the pre-deregistration 
volatility is lower than that of the post-deregistration period, the mean difference is only 
0.088. Compared with 0.126 of the original firms, the volatility is also relatively lower.  
 




On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed the JOBS Act into law; in the same year, Titles 
I, V, and VI became immediately effective upon enactment. Title I defines emerging 
growth companies and relieves them from the burdensome regulations and rules imposed 
by the SOX Act. Titles V and VI increased the deregistration threshold to 1,200 
shareholders of record for banks and bank holding companies, making it easier for these 
companies to deregister. However, since emerging growth companies comprise a large 
majority, the combined effect is the decrease in the number of deregistered firms.    
 
As mentioned, going-dark firms are those that delist from national stock exchange 
markets and deregister from the SEC but remain trading on OTC markets. Since 
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deregistration is the last step of going dark, I collected the list of firms that filed Form 15 
for the purpose of deregistration, excluding mergers and acquisitions, liquidations, and so 
on. Financial information regarding the firms’ size, intangible assets, leverage, insider 
ownership, and audit fees, as well as stock price information regarding momentum and 
volume, were collected to check whether the decision to go dark would have interactions 
with these factors. The results show that firms with higher audit fees and higher leverage 
are significantly more likely to go dark. These findings indicate that firms go dark 
because they cannot bear the enormous regulatory costs and may wish to hide their 
disadvantageous leverage information for fear of adversely influencing the stock price 
and public awareness. Checking the deregistration announcement’s effect on stock price 
and market liquidity reveals that outsider shareholders suffer from negative, cumulative 
average abnormal returns and significantly decreased market liquidity. These can be due 
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Table 1: Description of different SEC forms 
This table displays related SEC forms. Forms 15 and 15F were reviewed during the preliminary data 
collection process, while Forms 10-K and DEF 14A were referred to when searching for financial 
information about the firms that went dark.  
 
Form type Description 
Form 15-12b Termination of registration of a class of security under Section 12(g) or notice of 
suspension of duty to file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act Section 12(b). Section 12(b) requires issuers to provide 
pertinent financial data when they register securities with the SEC, including 
information on the corporate structure, management compensation, balance sheets, 
and so on.  
Form 15-12g Termination of registration of a class of security under Section 12(g) or notice of 
suspension of duty to file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act Section 12(g). Section 12(g) deals with issuers that are 
exempted from normal filing requirements. 
Form 15-15d Termination of registration of a class of security under Section 12(g) or notice of 
suspension of duty to file reports under Sections 13 and 15(d) of the 1934 
Securities Exchange Act Sections 13 and 15(d). Sections 13 and 15(d) require the 
filing of periodic documents, reports, and information related to the securities 
registered pursuant to Section 12 of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act.  
Form 15F Certification of a foreign private issuer and termination of registration. The foreign 
companies either revoke the registration of securities or fail to meet certain filing 
requirements so that Form 15F is used to notify the SEC and investors. It includes 
Forms 15F-12b, 15F-12g, and 15F-12d.  
Form 10-K A comprehensive annual summary of a company’s performance, including the 
company history, organizational structure, balance sheets, subsidiaries, and so on. 
Form 10-Q contains quarterly reports.  
DEF 14A Definitive proxy statement required when soliciting shareholder votes. This 
statement contains information about the management and the directors’ 
compensation and potential conflicts of interest. 











Table 2: Number of different firms that went dark 
This table displays the number of different firms (emerging companies and banks and bank holding 
companies [BHCs]) that went dark before or after the JOBS Act. Based on the JOBS Act, the emerging 
companies are defined as those with less than $1 billion in total annual gross revenues in their most recent 
fiscal year. The banks and the BHCs are firms with SIC codes classified in the Fama–French 49 industry 
portfolios.  
 
Before JOBS Act: 140    Emerging companies: 136  
  
Banks and BHCs: 12  
After JOBS Act: 108 
 
Emerging companies: 108 
  





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 6: Logit variable and market liquidity variable index 
This table shows the logit variables used in logit regression and the market liquidity variables used in 
examining the impact of deregistration on stock liquidity. The descriptions of these variables include 
detailed calculation methods, the data source, and so on.   
 
Panel A: Logit variables                                                                     
Variables                        Description                                                  














Audit fees ratio 
 
 

















The dependent variable equals 1 for firms that chose to go dark and 
0 for matching firms. The deregistered firms were matched based 
on two criteria, as follows: 
i) industry classification by Fama–French 5 industry portfolio and 
ii) total asset one year before deregistration. 
 
The firm’s total asset value 
The ratio of the firm’s intangible assets to total assets 
Leverage is calculated as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
 
It is the ratio of holdings of common shares by all directors and 
officers as a group to total outstanding shares. The insider 
ownership ratio was manually collected from proxy statements or 
from Form 10k from the EDGAR database.  
It is measured by the log of annual audit fees paid by a firm for 
certifying its financial reports. The annual audit fee data were 
collected from the Audit Analytics database. 
Based on Opler and Titman (1993), free cash flow is measured as 
operating income before taxes, interest, and depreciation 
(EBITDA). Free cash flow ratio is EBITDA divided by market 
value of assets. 
Based on Loughran and Ritter (1996), we define momentum as 
buy-and-hold market-adjusted returns for the jth firm in our sample, 
as follows: 
 
                         
                    
            , 
 
where       and      are the first and the last trading days, 
including those in the holding period, to calculate buy and hold 
returns;     is the daily return for sample firm j on date t, and 
    is the market return on the same date.  
It is the ratio of average daily trading volume over a period of 150 
trading days to total outstanding shares. The turnover is computed 
in the pre-deregistration period (-150, -31).                                           
 30 
 
Table 6 (continued) 
Panel A: Market liquidity variables                                                                     
Variables                           Description                                            
Mean volatility                       It is the standard deviation of the daily returns of stocks divided               
                                   by 60 trading days.  
Volume (turnover)                    It is measured by trading volume over total shares outstanding  
                                   multiplied by 60 trading days. 
Trading days                        The number of days that firms’ stocks are traded, divided by 60  

































Table 7: Partial impact of JOBS Act on go-dark firms 
This table displays the regression results of the partial impact of the JOBS Act on go-dark firms. The 
dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the firms went dark before the JOBS Act; otherwise, it takes a value 
of 0. The independent variables are the financial and stock price variables, which reflect the characteristics 
of go-dark firms.  
 
Variables Parameter (P-value) Variables Parameter (P-value) 
Intercept  0.77 (0.15) Audit fee -0.51 (0.63) 
Size  0.17 (0.45) Free cash flow  0.24 (0.27) 
Intangible assets  0.01 (0.55) Momentum -0.12 (0.12) 
Leverage   0.17 (0.66) Volume  0.10 (0.20) 
Insider ownership -0.13 (0.56) 
  N    93 
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